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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last quarter of the 20th Century, punitive damages were diverted
from their intended purpose of reasonably punishing and deterring wrongful
behavior. The United States Supreme Court noted in 1974 that "juries assess
punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary
relation to the actual harm caused."' Subsequently, the misuse and abuse of
punitive damages created a system of "jackpotjustice" in which some plaintiffs
get windfall awards and their lawyers get lucrative fees. Companies go into
bankruptcy and leave some plaintiffs with reduced claims or nothing.
Because of these and other problems, "legal controls" slowly but surely
have been placed on punitive awards by forward-thinking judges and elected
lawmakers at the federal and state levels. These controls place constitutional
and statutory limits on the amount of punitive damages and create procedures
for assessing and reviewing the awards.
Plaintiffs' lawyers know that efforts to curb punitive damages "run wild" 2
will eventually eat into their profits. They recognize that punitive damages are

1. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
2. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991).
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taxable under federal law, while compensatory awards are not.3 They
appreciate the need for an alternative, safer, and surer path to obtaining very
high awards that will be upheld by trial and appellate courts. The path leading
to punitive damages is an old one. Consequently, plaintiffs' lawyers, as this
Article will show, have poured new wine of punishment evidence, once used
to obtain punitive damages, into old bottles of pain and suffering awards.
Pain and suffering awards are intended to do exactly what their name
implies: provide reasonable compensation to an injured person for past and
future pain and suffering caused by the defendant. 4 These damages are
inherently subjective. Generally, courts will not second-guess the jury's
decision-making. State legislative efforts to enact statutory limits on the
amount of pain and suffering awards have been nullified in many cases by
activist judges.5 As a result, "[j]uries are left with nothing but their consciences
to guide them. '"6
This "hands off' approach has created the opportunity for plaintiffs'
lawyers to manipulate the system by using the defendant's alleged "bad acts"
to augment pain and suffering awards. Without proper oversight by trial courts,
plaintiff's counsel can direct the jury away from the needs of his client toward
the wrongdoing of the defendant. As a result, the fundamental purpose of pain
and suffering awards-to compensate the plaintiff-is upended. The defendant
is "punished," but the award is not subject to the extensive legal controls that
help assure real punitive awards do not cross the constitutional line.
To fully understand this new and challenging trend, Part II discusses the
history of the rise in punitive damages awards and the recent trend of
tightening legal controls governing them. Part III shows how the trend toward
judicial nullification has supplanted legislative efforts to place commonsense
limits on pain and suffering awards. Part IV demonstrates that pain and
suffering awards in asbestos, pharmaceutical, and other cases have been
escalating, sometimes reaching hundred-million dollar levels. Part V shows
how some courts have either wittingly or unwittingly permitted plaintiffs'
lawyers to use a defendant's "wrongdoing" as a basis for driving up pain and
suffering awards. Finally, Part VI discusses the true nature of pain and
suffering damages and suggests procedural, and legislative solutions to help
assure pain and suffering awards return to their fundamental compensatory
role.

3. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000) (Gross income does not include "the amount of any damages

(other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums
or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness.").
4. See 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979) (defining compensatory

damages).
5. See Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Regulation Through LitigationHas Just Begun:
What You Can Do to Stop It, BRIEFLY (Nat'l Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest, Washington, D.C.),
Nov. 1999, at 20-23.
6. Stanley Ingber, Rethinking IntangibleInjuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REv. 772,
778 (1985).
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LAWMAKERS ACT TO CURB EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS

Punitive damages are intended to punish a defendant's wrongful conduct7
and deter him and others from engaging in similar misconduct in the future.
Punitive damages have nothing to do with "making the plaintiff whole."8 That
purpose is served by compensatory damages which compensate tort victims for
economic losses and personal injuries, including awards for "pain and
suffering."9

A.

The HistoricalRole of PunitiveDamages

Until the mid-20th century, punitive damages were available only for a
relatively small group of torts involving conscious and intentional harm
inflicted by one person on another. These "intentional torts" included assault
and battery, ° libel and slander," malicious prosecution, 12 false imprisonment, 3
and intentional interferences with property.' 4 In general, at that time, punitive

7. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting that punitive damages
"are not compensation for injury" but "are private fines levied by civil juries to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence").
8. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 2,

at 9 (5th ed.

1984) (explaining that punitive damages are awarded to punish the defendant, teach him not to "do
it again," and deter others from similar behavior).
9. See 1 MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.03, at 1-14 (1989)

(noting the definition of compensatory damages includes compensation forphysical and emotional
harm).
10. See, e.g., Ward v. Blackwood, 41 Ark. 295 (1883) (noting that "vindictive or exemplary
damages" may be awarded "[i]f the assault was committed without fault in the part of the plaintiff
in a wanton and wilful manner, and under circumstances of outrage, cruelty and oppression, or
with malice"); Lyon v. Hancock, 35 Cal. 372 (1868) (allowing punitive damages in assault and
battery actions when malice can be shown); Trogden v. Terry, 90 S.E. 583 (N.C. 1916) (finding
sufficient evidence of malice to sustain jury's punitive damages award in assault action).
11. See, e.g., Sheik v. Hobson, 19 N.W. 875 (Iowa 1884) (noting thatpunitive damages may
be awarded in slander actions, though not in this case because the defendant's death ceased the
punitory powers of the law); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Ballard, 3 S.W. 530 (Ky. 1887)
(discussing the standard of conduct sufficient to authorize exemplary damages).
12. See, e.g., Brown v. McBride, 52 N.Y.S. 620 (Sup. Ct. 1898) (finding no errorwhere trial
court instructed the jury to award "smart money" in wrongful prosecution action if "they found
that the defendant instituted the action in wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of the
plaintiff").
13. See, e.g., Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893) (noting that
punitive damages may be awarded "if the defendant has acted wantonly, or oppressively, or with
such malice as implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference to civil obligations"); Green
v. S. Express Co., 41 Ga. 515 (187 1) (affirming grant of new trial because evidence did not sustain
an award of more than nominal damages).
14. These included trespass and conversion, for example, Dorsey v. Manlove, 14 Cal. 553
(1860); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Holdfodt, 86111.455 (1877); malicious attachment, for example, Yazoo
& Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Sanders, 40 So. 163 (Miss. 1905), Schumacher v. Shawhan Distillery
Co., 178 Mo. App. 361 (1914); and destruction ofproperty, private nuisance, or similar wrongful
conduct, for example, Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225 (1842); Whipple v. Walpole, 1ON.H. 130
(1839); Pickett v. Crook, 20 Wis. 377 (1866) (allowing exemplary damages generally but
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damages "were rarely assessed and likely to be small in amount,"'" only
slightly exceeding compensatory awards. 6
B. Punitive DamagesAwards DepartFrom Their Intended Purpose
In the late 1960s, American courts began to depart from the historical
"intentional tort" moorings of punitive damages. 7 Lesser misconduct could
now merit punitive damages. The amorphous terms "reckless disregard"
became a popular standard for punitive damages liability.'" A lower standard,
namely "gross negligence," became sufficient to support a punitive damages
award in some states.' 9 Furthermore, a number of states instituted the "triple
trigger" approach of willful or wanton or gross misconduct. The triple trigger
approach gave plaintiffs three separate paths to obtain punitive damages.
Changes in punitive damages law and practice impacted both the frequency
and size of punitive damages awards. Until 1976, for example, there were only
three reported appellate court decisions upholding awards of punitive damages
in products liability cases. The punitive damages award in each case was
modest in proportion to the compensatory damages award.2" Then, in the late
1970s and 1980s, the size of punitive damages awards "increased
dramatically,"'" and "unprecedented numbers of punitive awards in product
liability and other mass tort situations began to surface." 22 The advent of mass

reversing court's award here because of over-broad jury instructions).
15. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., FairnessandEfficiency in the Law ofPunitiveDamages, 56 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1982).
16. See, e.g., S. Kan. Ry. Co. v. Rice, 16 P. 817, 818 (Kan. 1888) ($35 costs and fees, $10
injury to feelings, $71.75 punitive); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342,397 (1873) ($150 actual, $331.67
exemplary reduced to "no more than $150"); Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N.H. 387,389 (1870)
($578 actual, $100 exemplary); Taylor v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 48 N.H. 304, 308 (1869) ($500
actual damages, $858.50 exemplary).
17. In 1967, a California appellate court held for the first time that punitive damages were
recoverable in a strict products liability action. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 418 (Ct. App. 1967).
18. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1)(a) (1996) (punitive damages may be awarded
if the tortfeasor acts willfully and with malice or intentional fraud or "reckless indifference toward,
and a disregard of, the rights of others").
19. See, e.g., Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168, 173 (Kan. 1988) (stating the standard to be
"gross negligence").
20. See Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 104 (6th Cir. 1975) ($125,000
compensatory damages, $50,000 attorneys' fees, $100,000 punitive damages), cert. denied,424
U.S. 913 (1976); Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403 ($175,000 compensatory damages, $250,000 punitive
damages); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 253 N.E.2d 636, 638 (I1. App. Ct. 1969) ($920,000
compensatory damages, $10,000 punitive damages), aff'd, 263 N.E.2d 103 (Il1. 1970).
21. George L. Priest, Punitive Damagesand EnterpriseLiability, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 123,
123 (1982).
22. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the ConstitutionalityofPunitive Damages, 72
VA. L. REV. 139, 142 (1986) ("Many of these awards were also unprecedented in amount."); see
also PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)
(describing tort liability as a ubiquitous tax which was set in place in the 1960s and 1970s);
WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED
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tort litigation led to an increase in punitive damages claims against
manufacturers, including the possibility of repeated imposition of punitive
awards for essentially the same conduct. Along with these changes came a
dramatic increase in the size and frequency of punitive awards. As one
respected commentator noted in 1989, "hardly a month goes by without a
multimillion-dollar punitive damages verdict in a product liability case."23
C. The United States Supreme Court Places ConstitutionalRestrictions
on PunitiveAwards

While the United States Supreme Court expressly acknowledged the
adverse impacts of excessive punitive awards several times in the 1980s, it still
"rejected or deferred"24 several constitutional challenges to them. Either the
Court ruled the constitutional provision invoked was inapplicable to civil
litigation, such as the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause,2" or the
defendant failed to raise more promising constitutional arguments earlier in the
litigation.26
A major change occurred in 1991 when the Court recognized in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip that punitive damages awards had "run

wild" in this country and should be subject to constitutional due process
limitations.27 Since then, the Court has increasingly placed legal controls on
both the amount and procedures for exemplary awards while reemphasizing its
concern that excessive punitive damages may infringe upon fundamental
constitutional rights. These legal controls include substantive due process
restrictions on the amount of punitive awards, procedural due process
requirements for the assessment of punitive damages and for meaningful
judicial review, and Commerce Clause limitations on a state's ability to use
activity outside its jurisdiction as a basis for punitive awards.

THE LAWSUIT (1991) (terming the litigious 1960s and 1970s a "unique experiment" and modem
jury verdicts "guesswork").
23. Malcolm E. Wheeler, A ProposalforFurtherCommon Law Development ofthe Use of
Punitive Damages in Modern ProductLiability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REv. 919, 919 (1989).
24. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 12 (1991).
25. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989)
(rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to punitive award on ground that the Excessive Fines
Clause was not intended to apply to civil cases).
26. Id. at 277 (refusing to address 14th Amendment challenge to punitive award where due
process violation was not raised below); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76
(1988) (refusing to reach federal constitutional claims, based on the Due Process Clause and the

Contract Clause since those claims were not raised in state court); cf Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 829 (1986) (disposing of unrelated issue makes it unnecessary to reach
federal constitutional challenges to punitive award).
27. 499 U.S. at 18.
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1.

ProceduralDue Process Governs PunitiveAwards

The Supreme Court took its first step in curbing punitive damages awards
when it made clear in Haslip that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment places restraints on these awards. 2' The Court explained that the
procedures for imposing the award and the court's review of punitive damages
must provide sufficient checks on unlimited jury discretion to protect
procedural due process rights. 29 While declining to establish bright-line
boundaries, the Court stated that "general concerns of reasonableness and
adequate guidance from the court when the case is tried to ajury properly enter
30
into the constitutional calculus.
In Haslip the Court explained, "the full panoply of... procedural [due
process] protections" had been applied. 1 These protections included
"reasonable constraints" placed on the jury's discretion by the trial court's jury
instructions. The "trial court expressly described for the jury the purpose of
punitive damages, namely, 'not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury' but
'to punish the defendant' and 'for the added purpose of protecting the public
by [deterring] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the
future."' 33 The trial court also instructed the jury "if punitive damages were to
be awarded, the jury 'must take into consideration the character and the degree
of the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of preventing similar
wrong."' 34 Thus, the Court found the trial court's instructions to be a
"reasonable constraint"-preventing inappropriate, unfettered decision making
by the jury.3" The Court also found that procedural due process was served by
the trial court's post-verdict hearing, which satisfied state law standards for
"meaningful and adequate review" of punitive awards, and by the Alabama
Supreme Court's scrutiny of the punitive damages award on review.36
In sum, while recognizing the severity of the alleged misconduct,37 the
Court in Haslip established a constitutional baseline for exemplary awards.3"

28. Id.
29. Id.at 18-20 ("As long as the [jury's] discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints, due

process is satisfied.").
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id. at 20.
33. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).

34. Id. (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 20.
36. Id. at 20-21.
37. The Court noted that "the trial court specifically found that the conduct in question
'evidenced intentional malicious, gross, or oppressive fraud."' Id. at 23.
38. See id. at 18.
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ProceduralDue ProcessRequires Meaningful JudicialReview

In two subsequent cases, the Court emphasized the important role
meaningful judicial review of punitive damages played in assuring their
constitutionality. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg39 the Court undertook an
extensive analysis of the common law role of judicial review in assuring that
punitive awards were not arbitrary or excessive. The Court ruled that an
amendment to the Oregon Constitution prohibiting judicial review of the
punitive damages awarded by a jury "unless the court can affirmatively say
there is no evidence to support the verdict"4 violated the Due Process Clause."
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.4 the Court ruled
that constitutional concerns required federal appeals courts to take a "thorough,
independent review" of the constitutionality of a punitive damages award and
required de novo review of exemplary awards.43 A less exacting standard of
review may, for practical purposes, result in the appeals court's deferring to the
trial court's decision.
3.

Substantive ConstitutionalLimits Placed on Punitive Awards

The Supreme Court hinted in Haslipthat substantive due process limits the
amount of punitive awards." The Court made this explicit two years later in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.4" The Court indicated in
TXO that punitive damages awards cannot be "grossly excessive" or they will
run afoul of the Due Process Clause.46 While the Court upheld the award before

39. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
40. Id. at 427 n.5 (quoting OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3).

41. Id. at 432. In holding Oregon's denial of judicial review of the amount of punitive
awards unconstitutional, the Court explained:

Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property.
Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing
amounts, and the presentation of evidence ofa defendant's net worth creates
the potential thatjuries will use their verdicts to express biases against big
businesses, particularly those without strong local presences. Judicial review
ofthe amount awarded was one of the few procedural safeguards which the
common law provided against that danger. Oregon has removed that
safeguard without providing any substitute procedure and without any
indication that the danger of arbitrary awards has in any way subsided over

time.
Id.
42. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
43. Id. at436, 441.
44. The Court noted that the punitive damages awarded to Mrs. Haslip-four times the
amount of compensatory damages-came "close to the line" of constitutional impropriety. 499

U.S. at 23-24.
45. 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993) (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 462. In TXO the Court considered a $10 million punitive award that was 526 times

greater than the actual damages of$19,000 awarded ina common law slander of title case. Id. at
451,453.
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it on a 6-3 plurality vote, the majority could not agree on the proper
constitutional analysis to be used. 7 Consequently, the Court's "splintered
decision"48 provided little practical guidance to practitioners and
commentators.49
Three years later the Court established a three-part constitutional test to
determine whether punitive awards were "grossly excessive." That test, set
forth in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,50 requires consideration of the
reprehensibility of the misconduct, the relationship between the penalty and the
harm to the plaintiff, and the civil and criminal penalties for comparable
misbehavior."' In Gore a doctor filed suit after an automobile distributor,
following BMW's nationwide procedures, failed to disclose that his new
automobile had been repainted due to slight damage before delivery. 52 A jury
awarded Dr. Gore $4,000 in actual damages and $4 million in punitive
damages. 53 The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive award to $2
million 4-- resulting in a 500-to-1 ratio of punitives to actual damages. The
Court found that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the

47. Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, reaffirmed
Haslip's determination that the Court "'need not, and indeed ...cannot, draw a mathematical
bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that
would fit
every case.... [H]owever,... a general concern of reasonableness properly enters into
the constitutional calculus."' Id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Haslip,499 U.S. at 18). The plurality found that while there was a "dramatic
disparity" between the actual damages and punitive award, appropriate procedural safeguards had
been followed and the award was not "grossly excessive" in light of the defendant's misconduct
and wealth and the potential harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 462. Justice Kennedy's concurrence
focused on the jury's behavior rather than the amount of the award. "When a punitive damages
award reflects bias, passion or prejudice by thejury, rather than a rational concern for deterrence
and retribution, the Constitution has been violated, no matter what the absolute or relative size of
the award." Id. at 467. Justice Scalia,joined by Justice Thomas, wrote a concurring opinion stating
that federaljudges should stay entirely out of this area. TXO Prod.Corp., 509 U.S. at 472 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Justice O'Connor sharply dissented, joined by Justices Souter and White. She
described the award as a "dramatically irregular, if not shocking, verdict by any measure." Id. at
481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48. Review of Supreme Court's Term: BusinessLaw and Taxation, U.S.L. WK., Aug. 10,
1993 ("The problem in the wake of the [C]ourt's splintered decision is not whether there are
substantive due process limits on punitive damages, but how to determine what they are.").
49. See, e.g., Nancy G. Dragutsky, Comment, Walking the Invisible Line of Punitive
Damages: TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 21 PEPP. L. REv. 909,959 (1994)
("[I]nstead of clarifying the standards set forth in Haslip, the TXO Court actually created more
confusion") (citations omitted); Andrew L. Frey & Evan M. Tager, Stoppingthe Deluge ofCostly
Punishment, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 9, 1993, at 20 (terming the TXO decision "a cacophony of
opinions").
50. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
51. Id. at 575.
52. Id. at 563.
53. Id. at 565.
54. Id. at 567.
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potential sanction and set forth the aforementioned three factors for
consideration."5
4.

Commerce Clause Implicated by Punitive Awards

In Gore the Court ruled that punitive damages awards should not be based
on conduct that is lawful in another state.56 The Gore award punished BMW's
nationwide policy of not disclosing pre-sale repairs to vehicles if the repairs'
cost fell below a specified threshold. Because BMW's threshold complied with
statutory disclosure thresholds in many states, the Court held Alabama could
not set punitive damages based on the number of vehicles sold nationwide but
must instead, at a minimum, apportion the award to Alabama sales alone.5 7
The Court held that principles of state sovereignty embedded in the
structure of the United States Constitution dictated that "a State may not
impose economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing
the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States."58 Each state may regulate only
within its borders no matter how wise a uniform policy might be. 9 Congress
is the appropriate legislative body to regulate interstate business practices that
may have adverse effects on the American public.6"
While the parameters of the Supreme Court's punitive damages
jurisprudence are still being worked out, several practical effects emerge from
these cases. They include the following: First, adequate procedures must be
used for the assessment and award of punitive damages to ensure that jury
discretion is reasonably constrained. Second, the amount of punitive damages
should have some reasonable relationship to actual damages; in extreme cases
the ratio may rise to 10-to-1. Third, the amount of the award should be
comparable to the amount of corresponding criminal fines. Fourth, punitive
awards cannot be predicated on conduct that is lawful in other states. Fifth,
meaningful judicial review is required to help assure the constitutionality of
punitive awards.
D. States Act To Control Punitive Damages

In light of the rampant nature of excessive punitive damages awards, a
number of state lawmakers sought to control them.6 Some state legislatures
enacted statutes that limited the amount of exemplary awards, either by

55. Id. at 574-75.
56. Gore, 517 U.S. at 573-74.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 572.
59. Id. at 570-71.
60. Id. at 571.
61. See, e.g., Leo M. Stepanian II, Comment, The Feasibility of Full State Extraction of
PunitiveDamages Awards, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 301, 302-03 (1994) (describing various statutory

curbs on punitive damages awards).
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creating fixed dollar limits or by limiting the ratio of punitive to total
compensatory damages. 2 Some states diverted a portion of the punitive
damages award to state coffers.63 States prohibiting punitive damages decided

to keep their bans in place. 4
More than half the states increased the level of proof required to obtain
punitive damages from "preponderance of the evidence" to "clear and
convincing evidence."65 A number of states chose to require bifurcated trials

62. See David Baldus et al., ImprovingJudicial OversightofJury Damages Assessments:
A Proposalforthe ComparativeAdditur/RemittiturReview ofA wardsfor NonpecuniaryHarms
and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REv. 1109, 1121 (1995).
63. This approach is likely to have the opposite effect from curbing excessive punitive
damages awards. Ifjurors learn that a portion of punitive awards goes to the state, they may be
more likely to award punitive damages or increase the amount of an award rather than focus on
the defendant's wrongful behavior toward the plaintiff. Currently, seven states have such
provisions although they vary in their details. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0200) (Lexis 2000) ("50
percent of the award [shall] be deposited into the general fund of the state."); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-12-5.1 (e)(2) (2000) (requiring 75 percent of punitive damages awards in product liability
cases, less costs and fees, to be paid into the state treasury); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1207 (West
2002) (giving trial court discretion to apportion punitive damages awards to the Illinois
Department of Rehabilitation Services); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A. 1(2)(b) (West 2002) (paying
to trust fund administered by the state the residual amount ofpunitive damages after payment of
costs, fees, and an amount not to exceed 25% to the plaintiff); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675(2) (West
2002) (awarding 50% of punitive damages after fees and costs to the state); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 18.540(1 )(b) (200 1) (paying 60% of punitive damages awards to State Department of Justice);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (2001). See also Michelle Riley Stephens, Punitive Damages:
Making the Plaintiff Whole or Making the State Wealthy?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 699, 701
(1996) (collecting statutes). Six other states, Colorado, Indiana, New York, Florida, Kansas, and
Alabama, had similar requirements which have been repealed by the legislature, or declared
unconstitutional or abandoned by the judiciary. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (repealed in
1997); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 8703 (expired 1994); Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262,273 (Colo.
1991) (enbanc) (statute declared unconstitutional); Cheatham v. Pohle, 764 N.E.2d 272,281 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002) (same). A Kansas statute applicable only to punitive damage awards in medical
malpractice cases was declared unconstitutional on other grounds and expired in 1989. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e); Kan. Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 264 (Kan.
1988). In Alabama, the state supreme court decided on its own initiative to require the sharing of
punitive damages with the state in 1996. See Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685, 702
(Ala. 1996), vacated, 519 U.S. 923 (1996). One year later, following the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Gore, the Supreme Court of Alabama reconsidered and abandoned the
allocation requirement. See Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 534 (Ala. 1997).
64. All jurisdictions except Louisiana, Nebraska, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Washington
State permit the award ofpunitive damages. New Hampshire only allows punitive damages when
expressly provided for by statute. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997). Michigan permits
"exemplary damages" as compensation for "mental suffering consisting of a sense of insult,
indignity, humiliation, or injury to feelings," but does not permit punitive damages for purposes
of punishment. PRODUCT LIABILITY DESK REFERENCE:

A FIFTY-STATE COMPENDIUM 312

(Morton F. Daller ed., 2000) (citations omitted).
65. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (Michie 1998); CAL.
CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (Deering 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(l)(b) (West 1997) (requiring
higher standard forpunitive damage awards exceeding three times the compensatory award); GA.
CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (b) (1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A. 1 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-3701(c) (1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (Lexis 1998); MINN.
STAT. § 549.20(l)(a) (1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(l)(a) (1998); MONT. CODE ANN.
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to keep potentially prejudicial evidence relevant to punitive damages out of the
liability and compensatory phase of the trial.66
A number of state courts introduced similar changes as well.67 Perhaps

most importantly, as a practical matter, judges at both the trial and appellate
level began to use their inherent power to reduce large awards.
E. Punitive Damages Become Taxable

Congress amended federal tax law in 1989 to provide that, unlike
compensatory damages, punitive damages are taxable gross income.68 Federal

§ 27-1-221(5) (1998); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-005(1) (Lexis 1998); N.J. STAT.
§ 2A:15-5.12(a) (Lexis 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-15(b) (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03.2-11.1 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A) (Anderson 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit.
23, § 9.1(B) (1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.537(1) (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (Michie 1999); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 41.003(b) (Vernon 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1)(a) (2001). See also Victor
E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, PunitiveDamagesReform-State LegislaturesCan andShould
Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L.
REV., 1365, 1381 nn.98-99 (1993) (citing jurisdictions adopting heightened burden of proof).
66. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(a) (Lexis 2001); CAL. CIv. CODE § 3295(d) (Deering
2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (d) (2001);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3701(a), -3702(a) (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.186(1)-(2) (Lexis
2001); MD. CODEANN., CTs. &JuD. PROC. § 10-913(a) (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1)(b)(c) (2001); Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.263(1) (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(a) (2001);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 42.005(3) (Lexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-5.13 (Lexis 2001); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 1D-25(a), -30 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11 (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 9.1 (B) (West 2001); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 41.009 (Vernon 2001); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-374.1(B) (Lexis 2001).
67. See, e.g., Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 353-55, 305 S.C. 104, 109-12 (1991)
(adopting more detailed post-verdict review process to comply with Haslip);Hodges v. S.C. Toof
& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 900-02 (Tenn. 1992) (reforming Tennessee's system because ofHaslip
by raising burden of proof, developing review criteria, and tightening standard for assessing
punitive damages). For a number ofcourts that unilaterally raised the burden ofproof for punitive
damages from a preponderance of evidence standard to a clear and convincing standard, see
Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986) (in banc); Jonathan
Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929,938 (D.C. 1995); Masaki v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d
566, 575 (Haw. 1989); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349, 363 (Ind. 1982);
Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1363 (Me. 1985); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d
633,657 (Md. 1992); Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 111 (Mo. 1996) (en
banc); Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at 901; Wangen v. Ford MotorCo., 294 N.W.2d 437,458 (Wis. 1980).
Courts also adopted a bifurcation procedure. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d
502, 506 (Fla. 1994) (allowing for bifurcated trial upon proper motion); Hodges, 833 S.W.2d at
901 (same); Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981) (same).
68. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2379
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1994)). Confusion over the tax treatment of damages received in
cases not involving physical injury had led to substantial litigation. See H.R. REP. No. 104-586,
at 43 (1996). Thus, the amendment was questioned as vague, and Congress later clarified
§ 104(a)(2) and added § 104(c), which excluded punitive damages from gross income in one
narrow situation. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat.
1838 (codified as amended in 26 U.S.C. § 104(a), (c) (2002)). Section 104(c) addressed an issue
created by a quirk of Alabama state law. Under Alabama law, punitive damages are the only
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appeals courts had been split as to whether punitive damages were the type of
damages received "on account of personal injuries" so as to be excluded from

69
gross income under the Internal Revenue Code. Congress explained:

"Punitive damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer and do not
compensate the claimant for lost wages or pain and suffering. Thus, they are
a windfall to the taxpayer and appropriately should be included in taxable
income. '
However, pain and suffering damages remain untaxed. This fact can make

a major difference in how much money a plaintiff actually receives. The taxexempt status of pain and suffering damages has not gone unnoticed by
plaintiffs' lawyers.
III. PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS LACK CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
GUIDEPOSTS

Pain and suffering damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff for
physical suffering and anguish. In some jurisdictions, they may encompass loss
of enjoyment of life and other intangible damages. However categorized, their
71
function is to compensate plaintiffs and not to punish defendants. Whatever
pain and suffering damages encompass in a given jurisdiction, the law does not

damages available in wrongful death actions. The amendment allowed the recovery of punitive
damages in such situations. See id.
69. Prior to the 1989 amendments, § 104 of Title 26 provided that gross income does not
include "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump
sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 104(a)(2) (West 1988). Appeals courts in four circuits had held that punitive damages were not
received "on account" of personal injuries or sickness because Congress had intended to exclude
only those damages that compensated for tort-like injuries and punitive damages were intended
to deter and punish, not to compensate the plaintiff. O'Gilvie v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550,1557
(10th Cir. 1995) (discussing cases).
70. H.R. REP. No. 104-586, at 143.
71. See McDougald v. Garber, 524 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196-201 (App. Div. 1988) (discussing
distinctions between damages forpain and suffering and loss ofenjoyment of life). The American
Law Institute has observed thatpain and suffering damages reflect concerns with a variety oftypes
of nonpecuniary loss, including:
(1) Tangible physiological pain suffered by the victim at the time ofinjury
and during recuperation ....
(2) The anguish and terror felt in the face of impending injury or death,
both before and after an accident....
(3) The immediate emotional distress and long-term loss of love and
companionship resulting from the injury or death of a close family
member.
(4) Most important, the enduring loss ofenjoyment of life by the accident
victim who is denied the pleasures of normal personal and social
activities because of his permanent physical impairment ....
2 AM. L. INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 199-200
(1991).
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provide an objective formula for valuing them.72 It is difficult to assess another
person's pain and suffering and then translate that into its financial
equivalent.73 In fact, "Courts have usually been content to say that pain and
suffering damages should amount to 'fair compensation' or a 'reasonable
amount,' without any more definite guide."7 4 As a result, jurors can be
improperly influenced by the presentation of "guilt evidence. '75 The amount
of pain and suffering awards can, and does, fluctuate markedly.76
A.

State LegislaturesSeek to Curb Excessive Pain and Suffering Awards

During the 1980s, state legislators sought to provide some predictability
in the amount awarded for pain and suffering as a way of lending stability to
dropping insurance markets. Excessive losses during that decade caused
insurance companies to raise premiums and cancel, or refuse to issue, policies
for certain high-risk activities. This made it difficult for businesses and
professionals engaged in risky activities, such as obstetric medicine, to get
liability insurance. Policymakers believed that limits on noneconomic damages
would render damages awards more predictable and help stabilize the insurance
industry.77 As a result, lawmakers in a number of states enacted statutory limits
7
78
either directly on noneconomic damages or on total damages. 1

72. The process for awarding pain and suffering awards has been called "procedurally simple
but analytically impenetrable. The law provides no guidance, in terms of any benchmark, standard
figure, or method of analysis, to aid the jury in the process of determining an appropriate award."
David W. Leebron, FinalMoments: DamagesforPain and Suffering Priorto Death, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 256, 265 (1989).
73. A number of courts and commentators have offered alternatives. See, e.g., Oscar G.
Chase, Helping JurorsDetermine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763 (1995)
(discussing various reform proposals).
74. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1, at 545 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Randall J. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain
andSuffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 913-14 (1989) ("This imprecision in the substantive law
forces the jury to rely on the presentations of the parties when computing losses.").
76. STATE OF MARYLAND, REPORT OF THE GOvERNOR'S TASK FORCE TO STUDY LIABILITY
INSURANCE 11 (Dec. 1985) (finding that noneconomic damages are "impossible to ascertain with
precision and are subject to emotional appeals to ajury") [hereinafter MARYLAND GOvERNOR'S
TASK FORCE].

77. See, e.g., MARYLAND GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 10 (concluding that
a $250,000 cap would "help contain awards within realistic limits"); Bovbjerg, supra note 75, at
924-27 (discussing problems associated with "variability" of damage awards).
78. See ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.010 (Michie 2001) ($1 million or person's life expectancy
multiplied by $25,000); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2001) ($250,000 limit on
noneconomic damages); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-302(1) (2001) ($250,000 limit on
noneconomic damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.207(7)(b), 766.209(4)(a) (2001) (capping
noneconomic damages at $350,000 per incident if the claimant rejects voluntary binding
arbitration); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 663-8.7 (Lexis 2001) ($375,000 limit on damages for pain
and suffering with certain classes of torts excepted); IDAHO CODE § 6-1603(1) (Lexis 2001)
($400,000 cap on noneconomic damages); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903(a) (2001) ($250,000 limit
on noneconomic damages in wrongful death action); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit., 24-A § 4313
(2001) ($400,000); MD.CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 11-1 08(b)(2) (2001) ($500,000 limit on
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B. Plaintiffs'Lawyers and Activist Judges Undercut Statutory Curbs

These statutes quickly came under fire. Plaintiffs' lawyers in key litigation
states such as Alabama, Florida, and Texas challenged statutory caps on
noneconomic damages as unconstitutional. They were most successful in
invalidating these statutes by challenging them under provisions of state
constitutions rather than the United States Constitution.80 State constitutions
often have complex provisions that have not received much, or any, judicial

attention. Consequently, a state constitutional challenge makes it easy for
plaintiffs' lawyers to preclude any appeal to the United States Supreme Court.81
Unlike some state supreme courts, the United States Supreme Court has

nonpunitive noneconomic damages); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (Law. Co-op. 2001)
($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages with exceptions); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1483(1)
(2001) ($280,000 limit on noneconomic damages with exceptions); MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210
(2001) ($350,000 cap per defendant on noneconomic damages); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-9-411 (1)
(2001) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice claim); N.D. CENT.
CODE. § 32-42-02 (2001) ($500,000 limit on noneconomic damages); S.D. CODIFIEDLAWS § 213-11 (Michie 2002) ($500,000 cap on noneconomic damages); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-7.1
(2002) ($400,000 limit on nonpunitive, noneconomic damages); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-8
(Lexis 2001) ($1,000,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice action); Wis.
STAT. § 893.55(4)(d) (2001) ($350,000 cap on noneconomic damages).
79. See. e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3(a)(3) (Michie 2001) ($1,250,000 limit on total
damages in malpractice action); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42B.(1) (West 2001) ($500,000
limit on total damages recoverable in medical malpractice action); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon 2001) ($500,000 limit on damages in medical malpractice claim); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2001) (establishing $1,500,000 cap on total damages in medical
malpractice action); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6(A) (Michie 2001) ($600,000 limit on total
damages in medical malpractice claim except for punitive damages and accrued medical expenses)
(repealed 1992).
80. Courts have struck down statutes limiting noneconomic damages as unconstitutional on
state law grounds in Alabama, Florida, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Utah,
and Washington state. See, e.g., Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill.
1976) ($500,000 limitation on recovery in medical malpractice actions violated state's equal
protection guarantee); Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1237 (N.H. 1991) (statute imposing
$875,000 limitation on noneconomic damages recoverable in actions for personal injury violated
state constitution's equal protection guarantee); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825,837 (N.H. 1980)
(statute imposing $250,000 limitation on noneconomic damages recoverable in medical
malpractice actions violated state constitution's equal protection guarantee); Arneson v. Olson,
270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (statute imposing $300,000 limit on damages recoverable in
medical malpractice action violated state and federal equal protection guarantees); Morris v.
Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 770-71 (Ohio 1991) (statute imposing $200,000 limit on "general"
damages recoverable in medical malpractice action violated state due process guarantee);
Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348,366 (Utah 1989) (statute limiting medical malpractice
liability of state hospital to $100,000 violated provisions of state constitution).
81. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber,
JudicialNullification of Civil JusticeReform Violates the FundamentalFederalConstitutional
Principleof Separation of Powers: How to Restore the Right Balance, 32 RUTGERS L. J. 907
VictorE. Schwartz etal., FosteringMutualRespectand
(2001) [hereinafterJudicialNullification];
CooperationBetween State Courts andState Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of
War, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000); Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 5, at 20-23.
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historically been reluctant to overturn economic legislation that does not
violate fundamental rights.82

Often "open courts" provisions in state constitutions are used to attack
limits on noneconomic damages.8 3 As a practical matter, these provisions are
intended to provide citizens of a state with justice and reasonable access to the
courts. However, open courts provisions have been broadly stretched by some

courts that have suggested any time a legislature
limits a person's rights to sue,
4
it is violative of the open courts provision.1

The Alabama Supreme Court is among those courts that invalidated
statutory limitations on noneconomic damages on the ground that the state
statute violated the plaintiffs' right to a jury trial under the state constitution's
open courts provision. 5 The court explained that "[b]ecause the statute caps the

jury's verdict automatically and absolutely, the jury's function, to the extent the
verdict exceeds the damages ceiling, assumes less than an advisory status."86 .

82. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,93 (1978)
(Price-Anderson Act, which preempted state tort law in order to promote the nuclear power
industry, does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the United States
Constitution); see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Federalism andFederalLiabilityReform: The
United States Constitution Supports Reform, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 269 (1999) (discussing a
century of congressional enactments changing state liability law and the numerous decisions
consistently holding those statutes constitutional).
83. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (attacking
statutory cap on various grounds, including state's right-of-access-to-courts provision); Smith v.
Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1095 (Fla. 1987) (statute imposing a $450,000 cap on
noneconomic damages recoverable in actions forpersonal injury violated open courts provision);
Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687,690 (Tex. 1988) (statute limiting liability to $500,000 for
damages in medical malpractice actions violated open courts provision); Sofie v. Fibreboard
Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 723 (Wash. 1989) (en bane) (statute imposing a cap on noneconomic
damages for personal injury at a rate of 0.43 x average annual wage and life expectancy violated
right tojury trial under state constitution). Thirty-seven states have open courts provisions in their
constitutions, although the effect of these provisions varies.
84. See Judicial Nullification, supra note 81, at 919 n.32 (collecting cases).
85. Moore, 592 So. 2d at 159 (Article 1, Section 11 of the Alabama Constitution provides:
"That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.").
86. Id. at 164. The Alabama Supreme Court further explained that the court's role in
reducing jury awards was limited to those situations only where the verdict is so "flawed by bias,
passion, prejudice, corruption, or improper motive" as to lose its constitutional protection. Id. at
171. The court also noted that the plaintiff had not raised a federal constitutional issue and that its
"analysis and conclusions regarding the constitutionality of [the statute]" were "based entirely on
adequate and independent state law grounds." Id. at 158.
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Other state courts rejected these arguments.87 For example, the Indiana
Supreme Court refused to find that a statutory limit on noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice cases violated the open courts provision of the Indiana
Constitution.88 The Indiana court said:
[T]here is no indication in the cases relied upon by appellants
that the right to have a jury assess the damages in a case
properly tried by jury constitutes a limitation upon the
authority of the Legislature to set limits upon damages. The
Legislature may terminate an entire valid and provable claim
through a statute of limitation. It may validly cause the loss
of the right to trial by jury through failure to comply with the
requirement to assert the right by procedural rule. It is the
policy of this Act that recoveries be limited to $500,000, and
to this extent the right to have the jury assess the damages is
available. No more is required...."
Statutory limits on noneconomic damages remain in several states. But for
the most part, in the overwhelming majority of states, juries awarding
noneconomic damages awards are subject to few constraints on their
discretion--either substantively or procedurally. The legal standards for
assessing pain and suffering damages are imprecise. Evidence of pain and
suffering plays on jurors' emotions, not their sense of logic. Because jurors'
judgment on these issues is believed to represent the very sense of the
community that justifies the jury system in the first place, trial judges are
hesitant to reduce the amounts of pain and suffering awards post-trial. Of equal
importance is the fact that the traditionally subjective nature of these damages
makes them difficult to consider on appellate review. Finally, no constitutional
guideposts help assess whether the awards are excessive.

87. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 686 (Cal. 1985) (holding

statute limiting recovery for noneconomic loss to $250,000 in action for medical malpractice did
not violate equal protection or due process guarantees), appealdismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985);

Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 599 (Ind. 1980) (statute limiting medical
malpractice liability to $500,000 did not violate right-to-remedy,jury trial, equal protection, or due
process provisions of state constitution); Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541,
557-58 (Kan. 1990) ($250,000 limitation on recovery for noneconomic loss due to personal injury
did not violate right-to-remedy orjury trial provisions of state constitution where legislature had
provided sufficient quid pro quo); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 527-34 (Va.
1989) (statute limiting total recovery against a health care provider to $750,000 did not violate

right to jury trial, due process, or equal protection; nor did it violate the separation of powers
provision or special legislation prohibitions).
88. Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 599.
89. Id. at 602.
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PAIN AND SUFFERING AWARDS ARE ON THE RISE

Recently, pain and suffering awards and other noneconomic damages in
asbestos, pharmaceutical, and other personal injury cases have been increasing.
They have reached hundred-million dollar levels. Consider the following
examples:
In April 2001, a Los Angeles jury awarded $55.32 million to a driver
and passenger in a tire separation case-including $49.85 million in
compensatory damages to the driver.9" Of that amount, $41 million of
the damages awarded the driver was for noneconomic damages." No
punitive damages were awarded.
The plaintiffs, who claimed the tire material was contaminated
during manufacturing, introduced what amounted to "guilt evidence"
of "intense production pressures" on workers.9" These witnesses "said

it was not unusual for floor sweepings and other contaminants to be
dumped in the rubber mix. ' 93 The plaintiffs also introduced a 1993
memo by a plant operations manager stating: "'We are out of
control ... and as you can see, it is not one particular defect, but a

conglomeration from every department.' 94 Plaintiffs' counsel said the
trial "'exposed the fact that [the defendants] had a manufacturing
process that put profits ahead of safety."' 95 The defense, which had
sought to exclude this inflammatory "guilt" evidence, denied any
defects and asserted that any contamination could not have caused or
initiated the separation.96

In February 2002, a New York jury awarded the family of a deceased
brake mechanic $53 million in compensatory damages, including $17
million for pain and suffering, for asbestos-related injuries.97 The

mechanic had sued forty-eight friction product companies alleging
they were negligent in exposing him to asbestos through brake linings
he used at work.9"

90. See Tire Separation Case Comes in at $55 Million, NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 4, 2002, at C21,
C23 (discussing Lampe v. Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., No. BC 173567, slip op. at 6 (L.A. Super. Ct.
Apr. 20, 2001)).
91. 34 TRIALS DIG. 4th 12, 2001 WL 1005976 (T.D. Cal. Jury) (discussing Lampe).
92. Myron Levin, Tire FirmOrderedto Pay $55 Millionfor Vehicle Crash,L.A. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2001, at A11.
93. 1d.
94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id. (The case ultimately settled for a confidential amount.).
97. Brown v. Berdex, No. 120595/00,2002 WL 481102, at * 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8,2002)
(N.Y. J.V. Rep.)
98. Id.
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In November 2001, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action was
99
awarded $115 million-$100 million of that for pain and suffering.

*
*

V.

The pain and suffering award was ten times greater than that which the
plaintiffs' attorney requested. The plaintiff was eight months pregnant
when she smoked crack cocaine, developed breathing problems, and
was taken to the emergency room.'00
In October 2001, a Mississippi jury awarded $150 million in
compensatory damages to six plaintiffs who alleged they were merely
exposed to asbestos but had no actual injuries-$25 million each.''
In September 2001, another Mississippi jury awarded $100 million in
compensatory damages to ten plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the makers
of the heartburn drug Propulsid." 2 No individual plaintiff s actual outof-pocket damages exceeded $700.

CASE STUDY: THE PROPULSID VERDICT

The $100 million verdict rendered by the Mississippi jury in the Propulsid
case provides a striking example of how the use of inflammatory "guilt
evidence" and calculated closing arguments can spike pain and suffering
awards." 3 The trial addressed claims of the first 10 of 155 Mississippi residents
who said they experienced heart problems, respiratory ailments, and anxiety
after taking Propulsid. The drug was withdrawn from general use in July 2000
but is still used under closely monitored circumstances.
The plaintiffs claimed that defendants Janssen and Johnson & Johnson
continued to aggressively market the drug despite mounting reports of adverse
reactions among those who used it and efforts by the federal government to
remove it from the market. The defendants argued that Propulsid was safe
when used as directed, and they had notified the government when they
discovered potential problems.
Although state law required the trial to be bifurcated for separate
consideration of punitive damages,'0 4 the plaintiffs introduced evidence during

99. See Sylvia Hsich, Jury OrdersHospitalandDoctorsTo Pay $115 Million, LAW. WKLY,
Jan. 7, 2002, at BI 5 (discussing Evans v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Brooklyn, No. 4038/91, slip op. at
I (N.Y. Co. Super. Ct. (Nov. 9, 2001))).
100. Id.
101. See Miss. Jury Returns $150M Verdict Against A C&S, DresserIndustries, 3M Corp.,
16 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, Nov. 9, 2001, at 4.

102. See Nation'sFirst Rezulin Trial Ends in Settlement, 6 MEALEY'S EMERGING DRUGS
ANDDEVICES,

Nov. 15,2001, at 19 (discussing Rankin v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., No. 2000-

20 (Miss. Cir. Ct., Jefferson County, Sept. 29, 2001). See infra notes 102-20 and accompanying

text. The trial court ultimately reduced the award to $48.5 million, and the defendants are
appealing. See J&J Files Appeal Notice of $48.5 Million Mississippi Propulsid Verdict, 9
ANDREWS MED. DEVICES LITIG. REP., Jul. 12, 2002, at 13.

103. See Rankin v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., No. 2000-20 (Miss. Cir. Ct., Jefferson
County, Sept. 29, 2001).

104. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (2002).
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the liability phase that clearly sought to target the defendants' supposed "bad
acts." Such evidence included the following:
*

*

Evidence that even after several label changes to strengthen warnings
for the drug, a Janssen official urged salespeople to "[c]ontinue to sell
the hell out of Propulsid" and promote it for conditions for which the
drug was not approved.105 The defendants argued the comment was in
a draft that was never distributed.'0 6
An internal Janssen document, "Propulsid, Lessons Learned," written
after the drug was withdrawn, stating that "[i]t is of critical importance
that we manage the FDA. Moreover, we have learned that you can
proactively manage the FDA (e.g., FDA talk paper timing and
content)."'

*

7

A document that allegedly suggested the company attempted to
manipulate the FDA, stating a company official "has been asked by
U.S. Upper Management .. .to outline a preemptive strategy to

preclude the presentation of cisapride at an [FDA] Advisory
Committee meeting ....[T]he agenda of the Advisory Committee is
public. Once known, this will appear in publications as the Pink Sheet,
Scrip and on the FDA-website."'' 8
In addition to using this evidence at trial, plaintiffs' counsel, Edward
Blackmon, Jr., stressed the defendants' "guilt" in closing argument. 10 9
Blackmon also referred to the Bible passage where Jesus threw out money
' 10
changers whose greed defiled the temple, and, thus, "made Jesus mad."
Blackmon stated if today Jesus "walked up to that temple, you know what
would be at the top of that temple? It would be Janssen and Johnson & Johnson
at the top of that temple when he walked in .

.

.

. They still in

there[sic] ....They in the temple[sic], and they asking you to let them keep
it.111

Blackmon argued that the defendants were really seeking to avoid lawsuits
when they set up the Propulsid limited access program allowing some patients
to obtain the drug under controlled circumstances. "[W]hen the noose closed
in on them when the FDA was saying put up or shut up, they went in and plea
bargained," he said." 2

105.

See Johnson & Johnson Seeks Relief From $100 Million Verdict, 6 MEALEY'S

EMERGING DRUGS & DEVICES, Nov. 1, 2001,

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

at 17.
Id.
Deposition Exhibit 154, Rankin (No. 2000-020).
Deposition Exhibit 119, Rankin (No. 2000-020).
Summation Argument by the Plaintiff, Rankin (No. 2000-020).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Back in April of 2000, they went into the FDA and said, look,
we are guilty, and mercy be for us[sic] .... If you take it off
the market, there will be people in Claibome County that will
use that against us because we know we have been doing
wrong and we don't want them to-we don't want to stand
'
up and have to surrender to them."113
Give us something to
fight with. Don't take it off the market. We'll stop selling
it... and then we can come into [c]ourt and say-when they
say 'pulled from the market,' we can say, 'no, not pulled
from the market.
No, you are wrong. It's a limited access
1 14
program.'
Plaintiffs' counsel's emphasis on the need to send a message to the
defendants' bosses up north regarding their guilty conduct almost certainly
inflamed and influenced the jury to award extraordinarily high pain and
suffering damages. After a month-long trial, jurors took only about three hours
to reach their verdict. They awarded the same amount of compensatory
damages ($10 million) for each plaintiff, even though the plaintiffs'
complaints, medical expenses, pre-existing medical conditions, exposures, and
expected life spans were vastly different.
Plaintiffs Robert Bailey and Macy Beth Johnston, for example, each
received $10 million." 5 Mr. Bailey was seventy-nine years old and had been
on disability since the 1960s. Macy Beth was four years old and, "according
to her treating physicians," had no cardiac damage. 1 6 The plaintiff whose
verdict was read first, Mary Williams, had only $535 in medical bills, yet she
received $10 million in compensatory damages-more than $18 thousand for
every $1 of medicals. 17
The day after the jury's 10-2 verdict, the trial court conducted a hearing
and decided not to have the jury consider punitive damages, because the judge
did not believe the defendants acted maliciously. Instead, the court entered
final judgment for the plaintiffs. The case is currently on appeal. Although the
judge reduced the award to $48.5 million, the ratio of pain and suffering to
actual economic damages is equal to or more than $4,500 per $1 of medical
expenses for Ms. Williams, whose $10 million award was reduced to $2.5

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Defendants' Motion for Relief from Judgment at 10, Rankin (No. 2000-020). The trial
court reduced Ms. Johnston's award to $7.5 million.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 2. The trial court reduced Ms. Williams' award to $2.5 million-nearly $4,700
for each $1 in actual damages. Rankin v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., No. 2000-20, slip op. at 3
(Miss. Cir. Ct. Mar. 28, 2002) (order granting remittitur).
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million."' Mr. Bailey, who introduced no evidence of medical expenses, also
19
received an adjusted award of $2.5 million.
VI. RETURNING PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES TO THEIR INTENDED PURPOSE

Pain and suffering damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff for
past and future pain and suffering and anguish. They should not be twisted into
a covert punitive damages substitute and provide the next oil well for "jackpot
justice."
A number of steps can be taken to prevent noneconomic damages, unlike
punitive damages, from "run[ning] wild" in the United States. 20
A.

Judges Must Act as Gatekeepers

Judges should act as gatekeepers to ensure that evidence presented in the
compensatory phase of a trial is truly relevant to proof of the claim. Evidence
of purported corporate wrongdoing is not relevant to establish the appropriate
amount of compensation for past and future pain and suffering, particularly in
medical malpractice, products liability, and premises liability actions. That
evidence is not only irrelevant-it is prejudicial. While evidence of
wrongdoing may be relevant to establish liability, it should not be used in
closing argument to inflate noneconomic damages.
B. JurorsMust Be ProperlyInstructed

The difficulty in placing a value on pain and suffering does not mean
jurors should receive no guidance from the court. To make sure pain and
suffering awards return to their fundamental compensatory nature, jurors
should receive clear, unequivocal instructions about the purpose of pain and
suffering damages.
A lesson can be taken from the United States Supreme Court's ruling in
Haslip.In Haslip,the Court ruled that proper guidance from the trial court can
place "reasonable constraints" on punitive damages sufficient to help assure
that procedural due process requirements are satisfied. 2 ' Proper guidance
includes instructions from the trial court regarding the policy purposes punitive
damages intend to serve. 2 Proper guidance also includes jury instructions
about how to consider the evidence of the character and degree of wrongdoing
alleged.'23

118. Id.; see also Transcript of Proceedings at 28-29, Rankin (No. 2000-20).
119. Transcript of Proceedings at 29, Rankin (No. 2000-020).
120. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991); discussion supranotes 27-

38 and accompanying text.
121. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18-20.
122. Id. at 19.
123. Id.
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To ensure they do not inflate noneconomic damages,jurors asked to assess
pain and suffering awards should be similarly instructed about the purposes of
pain and suffering awards.'24 Jurors should be instructed that the law requires
them to consider only what is necessary to compensate the plaintiff for his or
her pain and suffering. Jurors should be told they are not to consider any
alleged "guilt" or "misconduct" of the defendant when setting noneconomic
damages. Jurors should also be told that they must look at the specific
plaintiffs situation and not base an award on what they themselves would
"take" in a similar situation.'25 These instructions should accompany a
description of the elements of pain and suffering damages under applicable
state law.
Juries respect the leadership provided by the court. Jury instructions that
properly reflect the purpose of pain and suffering damages can therefore be
relied on by counsel for all parties during closing arguments.
C. State Legislatures Can Restore the FundamentalNature ofPain and
Suffering Damages
If a particular state court refuses to follow these fundamental rules of tort
law, state legislatures should act to ensure the protection of litigants' rights.
The substance of such legislation may differ from state to state, depending on
each state's constitutional provisions and legal principles. Legislators should
consider enacting legislation that bars consideration of "guilt" evidence when
awarding pain and suffering damages.' 2 6 They should also consider requiring
trial courts to perform closer reviews of pain and suffering awards during the
post-trial phase and to set forth their reasoning in writing when they uphold an
'
award that is challenged as "excessive." 127
Legislators may also wish to
consider whether to require de novo review of pain and suffering awards on
appeal.'28 The viability of the final approach will likely turn on the
interpretation given to that state constitution's "open courts" provision. This
approach may not succeed where activist judges already have refused to uphold
statutory limits on noneconomic damages.

124. A model jury instruction about the purpose of pain and suffering damages is attached

as Appendix A.
125. As one commentator wrote, "[T]here is no market in pain." Bovbjerg, supra note 75,
at 913.
126. See model legislation at Appendix B.
127. See model legislation at Appendix C.
128. See model legislation at Appendix D.
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CONCLUSION

Punitive damages "run wild" have discouraged innovation, forced
companies concerned about "bet the company lawsuits" to pull beneficial
products off the market, and fostered a cottage industry of contingency-fee
plaintiffs' lawyers looking for the next deep pocket. Legislators and judges
should be applauded for their efforts to curb excessive punitive awards. Now,
the spotlight should focus on unfair and outrageous pain and suffering awards
to prevent those awards from having similar consequences. The trend of using
pain and suffering damages to "punish" can be stopped in its tracks if judges
do the job they have taken an oath to do.
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APPENDIX A
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTION:
DAMAGES FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING-PURPOSE
Pain and suffering damages are intended to reasonably compensate the
plaintiff for past pain and suffering and for pain and suffering reasonably likely
to occur in the future.
When fixing the amount of pain and suffering damages, you are seeking
to compensate this plaintiff for the pain and suffering this plaintiff has
experienced or is reasonably likely to experience. You may not consider what
amount would be reasonably necessary to compensate yourself for comparable
pain and suffering.
Pain and suffering damages are not to be awarded to punish the defendant
or to deter future activity by the defendant. In fixing these damages, you may
not consider any evidence of the defendant's alleged guilt or wrongdoing.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54: 47

APPENDIX B
MODEL ACT REGARDING APPROPRIATE
EVIDENCE OF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES
Evidence of a defendant's alleged wrongdoing or misconduct shall not be
admissible for the purpose of fixing the amount of pain and suffering damages.
EXPLANATION: Few constitutional or legal guideposts exist for fixing
the amount of pain and suffering damages. As a result, jurors may be
excessively influenced by the presentations of the parties at trial. Pain and
suffering damages are intended to reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his
past [and future] physical [and mental] pain and suffering caused by the
defendant. They are not intended as punishment for the defendant or to deter
future misconduct. To ensure that pain and suffering awards are used as
intended, evidence of a defendant's guilt or misconduct should not be
admissible for use in the calculation of pain and suffering damages.
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APPENDIX C
MODEL ACT REGARDING
POST-JUDGMENT REVIEW
OF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES
1. Upon post-judgment motion, a trial court shall perform a rigorous analysis
of the evidence supporting a noneconomic damages awards challenged as
excessive.
2. A trial court upholding a noneconomic damages award challenged as
excessive shall set forth in writing its reasons for upholding the award.
EXPLANATION: Pain and suffering damages are intended to reasonably
compensate the plaintiff for his past [and future] physical [and mental] pain and
suffering caused by the defendant. However, few constitutional or legal
guideposts exist for fixing the amount of pain and suffering damages. As a
result, jurors may be improperly influenced by bias, passion, prejudice, or may
inappropriately consider evidence of the defendant's alleged misconduct or
guilt. To help assure that pain and suffering awards serve their fundamental
compensatory purpose, the trial court should be empowered to perform a
meaningful review of noneconomic damages awards. The rationale for
upholding a noneconomic damages award challenged as excessive should be
reduced to writing in order to facilitate appellate review of the decision.
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APPENDIX D
MODEL ACT REGARDING
STANDARD OF REVIEW
ON APPEAL OF PAIN AND SUFFERING DAMAGES
A reviewing court shall use a de novo standard of review when considering
an appeal of a noneconomic damages award on the ground of excessiveness.
EXPLANATION: Pain and suffering damages are intended to reasonably
compensate the plaintiff for his past [and future] physical [and mental] pain and
suffering caused by the defendant. However, few constitutional or legal
guideposts exist for fixing the amount of pain and suffering damages. As a
result, jurors may be improperly influenced by bias, passion, prejudice, or may
inappropriately consider evidence of the defendant's alleged misconduct or
guilt. To help assure that pain and suffering awards serve their fundamental
compensatory purpose, and to help develop legal guideposts for the award of
such damages, the reviewing court should be empowered to perform a
meaningful review of noneconomic damages awards on appeal.
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